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Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp.:
Recognizing Negligently Inflicted Emotional
Injuries Under The Federal Employers'
Liability Act

The United States Supreme Court in Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Gottshall' granted certiorari for two cases from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit ("Third Circuit").' Both cases involved
claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act ("FELA!).3 In Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., the plaintiff alleged that he suffered from major depression and
pest-traumatic stress disorder because his employer, Conrail, negligently
forced him to watch and actively participate in the events leading to a
close friend's death." Conrail dispatched plaintiff and several other
employees, including plaintiff's close friend Richard Johns, to replace a
defective stretch of track." Johns suffered a heart attack and died at
the work site. The crew's supervisor, Michael Norvick, was unable to
summon rescue workers because Conrail had taken the radio base
station off the air for repairs without notifying him.7 Once paramedics
arrived, they covered Johns' body and laid it by the tracks." Norvick

1. 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994).
2. Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1993); Carlisle v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 990 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1993).
3. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988). The Act provides in pertinent part:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce... shall be liable
in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in
such commerce ... for such injury ... resulting in whole or in part from the
negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier ....
45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
4. 988 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1993).
5. Id at 360.
6. Id. at 358. Most of the members of the crew that Conrail sent to repair the track
were in their fifties and many were overweight. Conrail also knew that Johns suffered
from high blood pressure and was taking medication for a heart problem. Id.
7. Id at 358-59. The coroner's report indicated that Johns' chances of survival would
have been greatly increased if he had received prompt medical attention. Id. at 359.
8. I& at 359.
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ordered the men back to work in plain view of the body.9 After the
incident, Gottshall was admitted to a psychiatric hospital where he
suffered from insomnia, loss of appetite, nausea, physical weakness, and
repetitive nightmares of Johns' death. 10 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary
judgment for Conrail." The Third Circuit reversed, holding that FELA
provides a cause of action for genuine and serious emotional injuries. 2
The case was subsequently remanded to the district court for determination of material issues of fact relating to breach of duty, causation, and
injury' 3 In Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp.," the plaintiff alleged
that the railroad negligently produced a stressful work environment that
caused him to suffer a nervous breakdown. 5 In 1984 Conrail reduced
its work force thus increasing Carlisle's responsibilities as a dispatcher.
Conrail moved Carlisle to trainmaster in 1988, which required him to
work long, erratic hours often in dangerous areas, while still performing
his duties as a dispatcher on occasion.' 6 Carlisle began experiencing
insomnia, headaches, depression, and weight loss. After an extended
period of working twelve to fifteen hour shifts for weeks at a time,
Carlisle suffered a nervous breakdown. 7 A jury awarded Carlisle
damages based on his FELA claim of negligent infliction of emotional
distress.'8 In upholding the verdict, the Third Circuit stated that no
common law standard for recovery had been adopted.' 9 Instead, the
court relied on the elements of common law negligence and added a
genuineness test based on a review of the facts and common law
standards.2' Reviewing both decisions, the Supreme Court held that
FELA does recognize a cause of action based on negligent infliction of
emotional distress.2 ' To recover under FELA, however, an employee
must also meet the criteria of the common law zone of danger test.2 2

9. Id.
10. Id. at 359-60.
11. Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 773 F. Supp. 778, 784 (E.D. Pa. 1991).

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

988 F.2d at 371.
Id. at 383.
990 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1993).
Id. at 91-92.
Id. at 92.
Id.
Id. at 97-98.
Id.at 98.
Id.
114 S. Ct. at 2407.
Id. at 2411.

1995]

GOTTSHALL

1529

Congress enacted FELA in 1908 to impose liability on railroad
companies for the large number of injuries suffered by railroad
The Supreme Court has liberally construed FELA to
employees.'
On
accomplish the remedial goals that motivated its enactment.'
issues not expressly addressed by FELA, however, the Court has said
that common law principles will guide the Court's analysis.' Congress
did not define "injury" in FELA; consequently, the Court's determination
of whether negligent infliction of emotional distress qualifies as an
injury relies heavily on common law principles.' Today, only a few
states do not allow recovery for mental or emotional harm caused by
another's negligence.2" In those states that do recognize a cause of
action for negligently inflicted emotional injuries, policy concerns have
prompted limitations on recovery.' The policy reasons most often cited
include: (1) the potential for an infinite number of trivial suits; (2)
unlimited and unpredictable liability; and (3) the fear of fraudulent
claims based on injuries that are difficult to measure.' In an attempt
to combat these fears, at least three primary tests have emerged from
the common law.3° First, the physical impact test requires a plaintiff
seeking recovery for emotional injuries to sustain some type of physical
injury from the negligent act that allegedly caused the emotional

23. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 318 U.S. 54, 58 (1943); Wilkerson v. McCarthy,
336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring).
24. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562 (1987) (citing Rogers
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957); Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 180
(1949)).
25. Urie, 337 U.S. at 174.
26. 114 S.Ct. at 2404.
27. Id. at 2405. See Allen v. Walker, 569 So. 2d 350, 352 (Ala. 1990) (noting Alabama
does not recognize negligent infliction of emotional distress). Compare Mechanics Lumber
Co. v. Smith, 752 S.W.2d 763 (Ark. 1988) with M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681 (Ark.
1980) (noting that the state of the law is unclear in Arkansas).
28. Edmund C. Baird, III, Comment, No Pain,No Gain:The Third Circuit's"Sufficient
Indicia of Genuineness"Approach to Claims of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Under the FederalEmployers'Liability Act, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1255, 1258 (1993) (citing W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 64 at 360-61 (5th ed.
1984) (The four factors that Keeton recognizes are: (1) the inability to measure mental
disturbances in monetary terms; (2) the remoteness of mental injuries as a consequence of
negligent acts; (3) the lack of precedent; and (4) the possibility for a vast increase in litigation)). Id. at 360.
29. 114 S. Ct. at 2411.
30. For a survey of limitations to recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress
see Douglas Bryan Marlow, Negligent Inflictionof Mental Distress:A JurisdictionalSurvey
of Existing Limitation Devices and Proposal Based on an Analysis of Objective Versus
Subjective Indices of Distress,33 VILL. L. REV. 781 (1988). See also Baird, supra note 28,
at 1259 n.30.
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injuries.3 1 This test attempts to avoid fraudulent claims by establishing a clear relationship between the negligent act of the defendant and
the injury suffered by the plaintiff.' However, the physical manifestation requirement has been criticized as overinclusive because it allows
compensation for trivial mental injuries if accompanied by any physical
injury. The requirement has also been attacked as underinclusive since
serious mental injuries may go uncompensated if a plaintiff escapes
physical injury.' The second test courts have applied is the zone of
danger test.", This test expands recovery to plaintiffs that suffer a
physical impact or apprehension of a physical impact from the defendant's negligent act.' The zone of danger test limits the scope of
potential recovery for emotional injuries but recognizes that sometimes
"a near miss may be as frightening as a direct hit.'
Fourteen
jurisdictions currently follow the zone of danger test.3 7 The third test,
the relative bystander test, was first recognized in Dillon v. Legg.' In
Dillon, the California Supreme Court concluded that reasonable
foreseeability should. govern recovery for emotional injuries."' The
court listed three factors that determine reasonable foreseeability: (1)
the plaintiff's proximity to the scene of the accident; (2) actual observation of the accident by the plaintiff; and (3) a close relationship between
the plaintiff and the victim.' ° Nearly half the states allow recovery
under this standard or some similar variation. 4' The courts using this
test believe that the factors established in Dillon limit recovery in a
manner consistent with existing policy concerns. 2 In Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Railway v. Buell,' the Supreme Court recognized the lack
of a uniform standard for negligent infliction ofemotional distress under

31. 114 S. Ct. at 2406.
32. Marlow, supra note 30, at 784.
33. Id.
34. 114 S. Ct. at 2406.
35. Marlow, supra note 30, at 794.
36. 114 S. Ct. at 2406 (citing Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted
Emotional Harm-A Comment on the Nature of ArbitraryRules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV.477,
488 (1982)).
37. Id. at 2406 n.9.
38. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
39. Id. at 920.
40. Id.
41. 114 S. Ct. at 2407 n.10.
42. Id. at 2407 n.11. One of the ways courts have limited recovery under the zone of
danger and relative bystander test is by requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate a physical
manifestation of the alleged emotional injury. Id.
43. 480 U.S. 557 (1987).
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FELA." The Court stated, however, that "broad pronouncements in
[the area of emotional injuries under FELAI may have to bow to the
Since Buell, no
precise application of developing legal principles.'
clear standard has emerged. The United States Courts of Appeals for
the First, Second, and Sixth Circuits have avoided the issue by resolving
FELA claims for emotional injuries on the general common law elements
When they have gone beyond a pure negligence
of negligence.'
analysis, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits have required unconscionable or outrageous conduct to recover
for emotional injuries under FELA. 4 The Fifth Circuit has expressly
rejected the relative bystander theory as a basis for recovery." Other
jurisdictions have been more willing to accept the common law tests as
limiting recovery for emotional injuries. In Holliday v. Consolidated
Rail Corp.," the Third Circuit applied the physical impact test to deny
recovery under FELA for a purely emotional injury' 5 However, the
Third Circuit has also shown a willingness to consider other common law
tests as a basis for recovery. In Outten v. NationalRailroad Passenger

44. Id. at 570.
45. Id.
46. See Moody v. Maine Cent. R.R., 823 F.2d 693,696 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding plaintiff
failed to prove his employer's conduct caused his emotional injuries); Robert v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 832 F.2d 3, 7 (lst Cir. 1987) (holding plaintiffs are required to prove the
traditional common law elements of negligence); Puthe v. Exxon Shipping Co., 2 F.3d 480,
483 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding plaintiff, a seaman, failed to establish foreseeability by alleging
that many years of exposure to the hardships of the sea caused him to suffer emotional
injuries); Stoklosa v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 864 F.2d 425, 426 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding
plaintiff failed to demonstrate his injury was reasonably foreseeable); ' Adams v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 899 F.2d 536, 539 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding plaintiff failed to prove breach of
duty and causation).
47. The basis for requiring unconscionable or outrageous conduct on the part of the
defendant appears to come from the courts' interpretation of Buell, 480 U.S. at 567 n.13.
Buell refers to Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 305 (1977), which held that state law
required outrageous conduct to recover on claims for emotional injuries. See Elliott v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 910 F.2d 1224,1229 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding plaintiff's FELA claim must
fail because plaintiff did not make a sufficient showing that the defendant's conduct was
unconscionable or outrageous); Netto v. Amtrak, 863 F.2d 1210, 1214 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding plaintiff cannot recover under FELA because no evidence was presented to
establish the defendant's conduct was unconscionable or outrageous).
48. See Gaston v. Flowers Transp., 866 F.2d 816, 821 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding recovery
for purely emotional injuries is improper under FELA when the defendant's alleged
tortious act was not directed at the plaintiff, but at a third person).
49. 914 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1990).
50. Id. at 427. The plaintiff claimed he suffered stress and accompanying physical
symptoms as a result of being placed in a job he was unqualified to perform. The court
held that plaintiff failed to allege an injury covered by FELA, and it granted summary
judgment for defendant. Id. at 422.
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Corp.,6 ' the Third Circuit applied several common law theories of
recovery, but it rejected the plaintiff's FELA claim because he could not
prove that he suffered a physical impact, was in the zone of.danger, was
located physically close to the alleged negligent act, or that he had any
personal responsibility for the incident.52 Failing to find guidance in
the federal common law, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit ("Seventh Circuit") relied on state law to establish a
standard for recovery in Gillman v. Burlington Northern Railroad.'
Holding that the zone of danger test is the appropriate test under
5
Illinois law," the Seventh Circuit has refused to reverse Gillman.,
Thus, since the Supreme Court left the issue of emotional injuries under
FELA open to developing legal theories, little has developed except
confusion.
Gottshall has done much to clarify the scope of claims recognized
under FELA.' Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas expressly stated
that the term injury, as used in FELA, encompasses claims for negligent
infliction of emotional injuries. The Court based this determination
on the common law's recognition of recovery for negligently inflicted
emotional injuries at the time FELA was enacted, the broad interpretation the Court has accorded the term injury in the past, and the severe
debilitating effect emotional injuries can have.s The Court's analysis
of FELA claims for emotional injuries, however, goes beyond defining
the term injury.5" The Court also adopted the common law zone of
danger test as limiting the scope of emotional injuries for which an

51. 928 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1991).
52. Id. at 79. Finding no support in the common law and the significant possibility of
fraud, limitless claims, and increased litigation, the court expressly refused to create a new
rule allowing recovery based on purely emotional injuries. Id.
53. 878 F.2d 1020, 1024 (7th Cir. 1989).
54. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the physical danger rule in Rickey v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1983). Thus, Illinois law requires: (1) the
plaintiff must be in the zone of danger; (2) the plaintiff must fear for his safety; and (3) the
plaintiff must demonstrate some physical manifestation of his alleged emotional injury.
Id. at 5.
55. See Ray v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 938 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding an injury
under FELA requires a plaintiff to be in the zone of danger to recover for emotional injury);
Bernas v. Soo Line R.R., 996 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1993) (unpublished disposition, stating
that to recover for emotional injuries under FELA in the Seventh Circuit a plaintiff must
prove physical contact or the threat of physical contact).
56. 114 S. Ct. 2396.
57. Id at 2407.
58. Id. at 2407-08.
59. Id. at 2408.
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individual can recover under FELA." In support of the zone of danger
standard, the Court pointed to three separate grounds for adopting this
particular common law approach."1 First, the common law recognized
a right to recover for negligently inflicted emotional injuries at the time
of FELA's enactment.6" Although the zone of danger test was not the
standard in a majority of American jurisdictions in 1908, the Court
believed the tests progressive nature at that time was consistent with
FEL's broad remedial goals.' Second, fourteen American jurisdictions currently use the zone of danger test.6" Thus, current usage
confirms that this standard remains a well recognized common law
concept of negligence." Lastly, the Court believed the zone of danger
test was consistent with FELs focus on physical perils." According
to the Court, the zone of danger test best accomplishes FELAs goals of
compensating injured workers and improving safety measures in the
future.67 The Court also noted that the zone of danger test best
achieves the general policy goals of preventing a large number of trivial
suits, the possibility of fraudulent claims, and unlimited and unpredictable liability. The physical impact test was dismissed as lacking
support in the current state of the common law, and its requirement that
a worker suffer a physical impact was criticized as unnecessarily
rigid.6" The Court further concluded that the relative bystander test
lacks the historical support of the zone of danger test, and it unnecessarily extends recovery beyond FEIs emphasis on protecting against
physical harm. 0 In his concurrence, Justice Souter expressed his belief
that the Court's duty in interpreting FELA is to create a federal common
law.' He also asserted that the majority correctly adopted the zone of
danger test as the appropriate standard under federal common law. 2
The dissent, led by Justice Ginsburg, criticized the majority on several
grounds. 3 First, Justice Ginsburg noted that the majority failed to

60. Id. at 2410.
61. Id. at 2410-11.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 2410.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2411.
Id.
Id.
Id.

71. Id. at 2412 (Souter, J., concurring).

72. Id.
73. Id. at 2412-19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

1534

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

decide what point in time-present or historical-should be determinative of the relative support of each common law standard. 74 Next, she
disagreed with the majority's position that potential liability for
emotional injury claims under FELA is infinite." Lastly, she concluded
that the zone of danger test fails to accomplish FELA's broad remedial
goals of protecting railroad employees from on-the-job injuries." In her
opinion, the Court should have adopted the Third Circuit's genuineness
standard.77
Despite the division within the Court, the Gottshalldecision resolved
two unsettled issues." First, the Court answered the question left
unresolved by Buell by expressly holding that negligent infliction of
emotional distress is an injury within the meaning of FELA' Second,
the Court determined that recovery for negligently inflicted emotional
injuries should be limited to employees within the zone of danger."
Thus, Gottshall establishes a consistent standard for negligent infliction
of emotional injury claims made under FELA-nonexistent until now."1
Existing FELA jurisprudence provides guidance on whether the Court
chose the right standard. In Urie v. Thompson,'2 the Court summed up
its interpretation of FELA throughout the years as a "constant and
established course of liberal construction ... .'
Holding the term
injury to encompass negligently inflicted emotional injuries has expressly
expanded FELAs scope thus further liberalizing FELAs coverage. Also,
in enacting FELA "Congress intended the creation of no static remedy,
but one which would be developed and enlarged to meet changing

74. Id. at 2417.
75. Id. at 2418. According to Justice Ginsburg, the scope of possible plaintiffs under
FELA is sufficiently limited because FELA only applies to railroad workers. She also
suggests that requiring objective medical proof of an actual injury would solve the problem
of authenticating claims for emotional injuries. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2419. For discussions of the need to eliminate FELA altogether in favor of
the worker's compensation system, see Thomas E. Baker, Why Congress Should Repeal the
Federal Employers' LiabilityAct, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79 (1992); Arnold I. Havens, The
FederalEmployers' Liability Act: A CompensationSystem in Urgent Need of Reform, 34
FED. B. NEWS & J. 310 (1987). For an article in support of maintaining FELA, see Jerry
J. Phillips, An Evaluationof the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
49 (1988).
78. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
79. 114 S. Ct. at 2407.
80. Id. at 2411.
81. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
82. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
83. ld. at 181-82.
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conditions and changing concepts of industry's duty toward its workers."' Allowing recovery for purely emotional injuries can clearly be
viewed as enlarging the railroad's duty to its workers.' Lastly, the
zone of danger test advances at least two common law policy considerations. First, the test limits the class of possible plaintiffs thus avoiding
an infinite number of trivial claims. Second, the test should reduce the
unpredictability of liability that has existed since Buell.' This last
policy concern may prove Gottshall's greatest contribution to FELA
jurisprudence. Under the zone of danger test, the railroad should be able
to more accurately predict the type of conduct that will constitute
negligence for purposes of FELA. Thus, the railroad should improve
safety conditions to prevent recovery for emotional injuries suffered by
employees within the zone of danger. Moreover, a universal standard
should promote stability within the law by producing more consistent
judgments under FELA. Therefore, the Court's holding in Gottshall will
expand the scope of recovery for employees while establishing a standard
on which employers can rely to prevent future liability under FELA.
J. SCOTr HALE

84.
85.
injury
86.

Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432 (1958).
See Buell, 480 U.S. at 570 (stating that "whether one can recover for emotional
may not be susceptible to an all-inclusive 'yes' or 'no' answer.")
114 S. Ct. at 2411.

